What is a question? According to Cox a question can be identified with the set of assertions that constitute possible answers. In this paper we propose a different approach that combines the notion that questions are requests for information with the notion that probability distributions represent uncertainties resulting from lack of information. This suggests that to each probability distribution one can naturally associate that particular question which requests the information that is missing and vice-versa. We propose to represent questions q by probability distributions Next we consider how questions relate to each other: to what extent is finding the answer to one question relevant to answering another? A natural measure of relevance is derived by requiring that it satisfy three desirable features (three axioms). We find that the relevance of a question q to another question Q turns out to be the relative entropy S[q, Q] of the corresponding distributions. An application to statistical physics is briefly considered.
Introduction
What is a question? According to Cox a question can be identified with the set of assertions that constitute possible answers [1, 2] . A number of applications and formal developments by R. Fry [3] and by K. Knuth [4] have proved that this definition is, indeed, fruitful. It allows the elegant and powerful mathematics of the theory of partially ordered sets to be brought to bear on the field of logical inquiry.
It is undeniable that Cox's simple definition captures an essential part of the notion of question, but it is not clear that it completely exhausts it. In this paper I approach the subject from a different direction. I turn to an older definition according to which a question is a request for information. From this point of view one should expect natural connections between a theory of inquiry and a theory of information and to inductive logic, that is, to reasoning in situations of uncertainty. In other words, we should expect close connections to the notions of probability and of entropy.
The problem with defining questions as requests for information is that the definition is somewhat vague and it might not be clear how it could provide a quantitative foundation for a theory of inquiry. We need to be more specific about what we mean by a request for information. The necessary refinement is suggested by the fact that a probability distribution is an expression of doubt; it is an admission of uncertainty and, implicitly, a request for information. We propose that a question is a probability distribution. In our approach a question goes beyond the simple enumeration of the possible answers; it also reflects the specific information we request. One of the purposes of this paper is to motivate this definition, to show that it is useful and that the resulting theory does not contradict but rather complements and extends the theory of inquiry based on the Cox definition (section 2). Among other advantages it allows a straightforward extension of the theory of logical inquiry to the continuum.
Incidentally, the realization that there exists a close relation between a question and a probability distribution, a relation that for the purposes of this paper we take to be identity, explains the remarkable and puzzling "neglect accorded to questions throughout most, if not all, of the history of logic and probability" [2] . There has been no urgent need to develop a theory that is explicitly a theory of questions because many of the problems such a theory would solve are already being solved by the theory of probability. The theory of probability is implicitly a theory of inquiry.
In section 3 we consider how questions relate to each other, more specifically, we seek a quantitative measure of the extent to which answering one question is relevant to answering another. This allows us to rank questions according to how relevant they are to a given prior question. Three natural axioms are proposed that define a unique measure of relevance. The axioms reflect the conviction that of all questions q within a certain family, the most relevant to answering the prior question Q is the q that is "closest" to Q in that it requests "nearly" the same information. Perhaps it is not surprising that once we have identified questions with probability distributions we find that the relevance of question q to question Q turns out to be the relative entropy S[q, Q] of the corresponding distributions.
A possible objection is that many of the mathematical equations in this paper have previously appeared elsewhere [5] and all we have done is change the names assigned to the various symbols: what used to be called a probability distribution is now called a question, what was previously called an amount of information or a degree of preference is now called relevance; in essence this paper is nothing more than mere word games. To a certain extent this is, of course, true: we are playing word games, but these are not "mere" word games. It is precisely the assigning of different meanings to the old symbols that suggests how to use them in new ways and allows one to tackle new problems. One familiar example is Bayes' theorem: both frequentists and Bayesians can prove the theorem but it is only under a Bayesian interpretation that its full potential can be recognized and exploited.
The present paper represents one more step in an ongoing program to extend the range of applicability of the concept of entropy: here we interpret entropy as a measure of relevance and use it as a tool for inquiry. Shannon's use of entropy as a measure of amount of information was exploited by Jaynes to develop a general method to assign probabilities -the MaxEnt method. Later work by Shore and Johnson, Skilling, and others culminated in the realization that entropy is a tool for processing information, for updating from a prior distribution to a posterior distribution when information is supplied in the form of constraints [5, 6, 7] . When used in this way entropy needs no interpretation, we do not need to know what it means, we just need to know how to use it. This form of the maximum entropy method, the ME method, allows one to tackle problems that lie beyond the reach of MaxEnt [8] .
As an illustration we briefly consider in section 4 an application in statistical physics. Specifically, we formulate the question: what is the value of a certain macroscopic quantity? We obtain a full probability distribution and not merely an estimate of the answer.
What is a question?
Our uncertainty about a variable x is described by a probability distribution q(x). The distribution q(x) is a faithful representation of the information we have about x, and conversely it also represents the information that we do not have and that we presumably desire to obtain. Indeed, to the probability distribution that reflects lack of a certain piece of information it is natural to associate the question that requests it. Conversely, to the question that requests a certain information one can associate the probability distribution that represents the rational beliefs of someone who lacks that particular piece of information. This suggests that questions interpreted as requests for information can be identified with the corresponding probability distributions: Definition PD: A question is a probability distribution.
One immediate consequence of this definition is that the age-old controversy about whether probabilities are subjective or objective or some mixture of both carries over to the nature of questions. Another consequence is that the rules to manipulate questions are fixed by the requirement that they be compatible with the rules to manipulate the corresponding probability distributions -the sum and the product rules. Perhaps the main advantage is that a properly formulated PD question explicitly incorporates all we know and makes estimating the answer straightforward (at least in principle); short of acquiring more information this is the best we can do.
On the other hand the Cox-Knuth (CK) definition identifies questions with the set of answers: Definition CK: A question is a set of statements that includes all statements that qualify as answers plus all other statements that imply those answers.
The definitions CK and PD are sufficiently different that one might wonder whether the two resulting theories of inquiry are at all compatible. Assertions, that is, answers, form a Boolean lattice that is partially ordered by the relation of implication and on which one can define probabilities as degrees of partial implication. The foundation of the CK approach to logical inquiry is that the corresponding questions also form a lattice, which, however, is not Boolean (the notion of the complement or negation of a question is not, in general, defined [4] ).
The PD definition requires that the set of answers {x} be specified and the values of x must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such sets of answers lead to what in the CK approach are called "partition" questions. The CK definition, however, also allows other kinds of questions that are strange and do not quite conform with our intuition of what questions ought to be. These strange questions include "vain" questions which having no true answers are clearly the "wrong" question to ask. For example, the question 'Is the book green or blue?' is vain when the book happens to be red; 'Is the electron a particle or a wave?' is another vain question because the true answer is 'neither'. Questions that do have a true answer are called 'real' and conform to our intuition of what a "correct" question is. Also strange are the so-called "ideal" questions which have only one answer. For example, the set of answers that defines the question 'What color is Napoleon's white horse?' is limited to the single element 'white' and it is not clear why one would bother to ask such a "dumb" question in the first place. Remarkably, despite appearances, these "wrong" and "dumb" questions actually play useful roles within the CK approach to logical inquiry.
From the perspective of the previous paragraph PD questions are special cases of CK questions. But this is not the end of the story. To the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set {x}, which defines a single unique CK real question, one can associate an infinity of probability distributions. Therefore the single CK question can be resolved into an infinity of different PD questions. From this second perspective it is the PD questions that constitute the generalization.
These brief remarks suggest that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory; they explore different aspects of the logic of inquiry. I suspect that a more complete theory of inquiry will eventually be constructed by a fusion of concepts from both.
Entropy as a measure of relevance
Given a question Q(x) the ultimate goal is to find its answer and this is not always easy. One of the strategies one can follow is to replace Q(x), which we will call the prior question, by another presumably easier question q(x). This might not completely resolve the prior question but, at least, it may represent some progress. The problem is to select from a given family of trial "easy" questions that which is most "relevant" to resolving the prior question. Typically the family of trial questions will be defined by suitable constraints on the corresponding probability distributions.
We want to rank the questions within the trial family according to their relevance, then it will be easy to pick the most relevant one. The ranking must be transitive: if, relative to the prior question Q, question q 1 is more relevant than question q 2 , and q 2 is itself more relevant than q 3 , then q 1 is more relevant than q 3 . Such transitive rankings can be implemented by assigning to each question q a real number S[q, Q] and, therefore, it is natural to "measure" relevance by real numbers. Next, we define the general theory of relevance, that is, the functional form of S[q, Q], by invoking the seemingly trivial but nevertheless fundamental inductive principle that 'If a general theory exists, it must apply to special cases.' [7] . The idea is simple: If the most relevant distribution happens to be known in a special case, then this knowledge can be used to constrain the form of S[q, Q]. A sufficient number of such constraints can lead to the complete specification of S[q, Q]. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that a completely general theory does not exist, that S[q, Q] might be overspecified by too many special cases and that there is no S[q, Q] that simultaneously reproduces them all.
The known special cases, called the "axioms", play the crucial role of defining which general theory is being constructed; they define what we mean by 'relevance'.
To motivate the choice of axioms we consider first an extreme example (a special case of axiom 1 below): Within the unconstrained family of all possible questions {q}, the question q Q that is most relevant to answering Q is Q itself, q Q = Q. Indeed, the answer to q Q tells us precisely the answer to Q. The axioms below are elaborations of the basic idea that one question is very "relevant" to another when both are essentially requesting the same information, that is, when the corresponding distributions are very "close" to each other.
Three axioms, a brief justification and their consequences for the form of S[q, Q] are given below (detailed proofs appear in [5] ).
Axiom 1: Locality. Local constraints have local effects. If the constraints that define a family of trial questions do not refer to a certain domain D ⊆ {x}, then the selected most relevant question q Q (x) and the prior question Q(x) should, within D, request the same information, that is, the corresponding conditional probabilities should coincide, q Q (x|D) = Q(x|D). The consequence of the axiom is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute additively to the relevance: S[q, Q] = dx F Q (q(x)) where F Q is some unknown function.
Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance. The ranking according to relevance does not depend on the system of coordinates. The coordinates x that label the possible answers are arbitrary; they carry no information. The consequence of this axiom is that S[q, Q] = dx q(x)f (q(x)/m(x)) involves coordinate invariants such as dx q(x) and q(x)/m(x), where m(x) is a density, and both functions m(x) and f are, at this point, still to be determined.
Next we determine m(x) using the special instance of the locality axiom that was mentioned earlier: we allow the domain D to extend over the whole space {x} so that within the unconstrained family of all possible questions {q}, the question that is most relevant to Q is Q itself. But maximizing S[q, Q] subject to no constraints gives q Q (x) ∝ m(x), and therefore m(x) ∝ Q(x). Up to normalization m(x) is Q(x). Axiom 3: Subsystem independence. When a system is composed of subsystems that are believed to be independent it should not matter whether our inquiries treat them separately or jointly. Specifically, let the possible states of a composite system be described by (x 1 , x 2 ) . Suppose that when we treat the subsystems separately we decide that the question about subsystem 1 that is most relevant to the prior question Q 1 (x 1 ) is q Q1 (x 1 ) and, similarly, that for subsystem 2 the question that is most relevant to Q 2 (x 2 ) is q Q2 (x 2 ). On the other hand, when we treat the subsystems jointly the prior question is
. This question does not request information about correlations because we already believe the subsystems are independent. We seek the most relevant distribution q Q (x 1 , x 2 ) within a family {q(x 1 , x 2 )}. Axiom 3 states that the selected q Q (x 1 , x 2 ) should also not request information about correlations and that it should be q Q1 (x 1 )q Q2 (x 2 ) unless this product distribution is explicitly excluded from the family {q(x 1 , x 2 )}.
The consequence of axiom 3 is that the function f is restricted to be a logarithm. (The fact that the logarithm applies also when the subsystems are not independent follows from our inductive hypothesis that the ranking scheme has general applicability.)
The overall consequence of these three axioms is that questions q(x) should be ranked relative to the central question Q(y) according to the (relative) entropy of the corresponding distributions,
This derivation has singled out the entropy S[p, Q] as the unique criterion for ranking according to relevance. Other criteria may be useful for other purposes but they are not a generalization from the simple cases described in the axioms.
Questions and relevance in statistical physics
Let the microstates of a physical system be denoted by x; let m(x)dx be the number of microstates in the range dx; and let the system be in equilibrium at temperature T ,
where H(x) is the Hamiltonian, β = 1/kT , and Z = dx m e −βH . On the basis of the information in P (x) many quantities can be estimated accurately but, when it happens that estimates of some other quantities are not satisfactory we might suspect that not all relevant information has been taken into account.
Let us assume that the information that we should have taken into account is the value of a macroscopic variable A. (With suitable notation changes we could easily consider several variables.) From a microscopic point of view A is interpreted as the expected value of some micro-variable a(x), A def = a , and the distribution that incorporates this information and no more is
where Z(λ) is the appropriate partition function and the Lagrange multiplier λ is determined from ∂ log Z/∂λ = −A.
Our goal is to formulate the question 'What is A?'. Of course, it is straightforward to find an answer on the basis of the information codified into P (x); just average over P to get A ≈ a P . This is the best we can do with the information in P but here we deal with a situation where we have the additional information that the "true" (i.e. a much better) distribution is a member of the family q(x|A). By formulating the question 'What is A?' we mean to be very explicit about what information is being requested and about the information that is already available; we want a probability distribution q(A).
In P (x) we were originally asking 'What is x?'; now we also ask 'What is A?'. The universe of discourse is not the set of microstates {x}, but the larger set {A, x}; the questions we now ask are joint distributions. Of all questions q(A, x) within a certain family we seek that which is closest to our original prior question Q(A, x) determined by two requirements: first, that Q(A, x)dA = P (x), and second, that when we know absolutely nothing about A, Q(A, x) must be a product µ(A)P (x) with µ(A) chosen as uniform as possible. The question of what do we mean by 'uniform' is settled by supplying the additional information that to each A there corresponds a probability distribution q(x|A), eq.(3). Thus, there is a natural measure µ(A) = γ 1/2 (A) in the space of As which is given by the Fisher-Rao metric between the corresponding probability distributions q(x|A),
We are now ready to take the final step: to find the question q(A, x) that is closest, most relevant to the prior question Q(A, x) = γ 1/2 (A)P (x) we maximize
subject to the constraint that q(A, x) be normalized and that it be of the form q(A, x) = q(A)q(x|A) with q(x|A) given by eq.(3). Varying over q(A) gives
Note that the density exp S(A) is a scalar function and the presence of the Jacobian factor γ 1/2 (A) makes Eq.(6) manifestly invariant under changes of the coordinates A.
The distribution q(A) is the question we sought to formulate. Once the question is formulated we can estimate an answer. The most probable A (the value that maximizes the probability per unit volume) is such that q(x|A) is closest to requesting the same information as the original P (x); it maximizes the relevance S(A) of the question q(x|A) relative to the prior question P (x). Eq.(6) also tells us the degree to which values of A away from the maximum are ruled out by the available information.
Conclusion
In this paper the logic of inquiry has been explored from a point of view that captures an aspect of what we mean by a question -a question is a request for information -that had not been previously addressed within the Cox-Knuth approach.
First we asked 'What is a question?' and then we took a first step in addressing the issue of 'What is the question?' at least in the restricted context of selecting the question within a family that is most relevant to answering another "prior" question.
It is to be expected that the ideas explored here should apply whenever we are confronted with deciding what is the most relevant question to ask. Obvious examples include the optimal design of experiments and when selecting which variables are most relevant to the description of a certain phenomenon. At the very least it is clear that much remains to be done, both in terms of seeking a closer integration with the Cox-Knuth approach, in pursuing applications, and ultimately in seeking a deeper understanding of both 'What is a question?' and 'What is the question?'.
